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THE UNITARY PROGRESS CLAUSE: DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA V. HELLER AND THE STRUCTURAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE PROGRESS CLAUSE
Joshua I. Miller†
Abstract
Since around 1950, the Progress Clause of the Constitution has
been read in a distributive manner. That is to say, it is read as
granting two separate powers: the power to promote the progress of
science through copyright, and the power to promote the progress of
useful arts through patent. This dichotomy has led to some confusion
in certain subject matter areas that span the two regimes, like
architectural works, computer programs, and design patents. In
addition, because the distributive reading effectively separates
copyright and patent, this reading may undermine certain doctrines,
such as copyright’s secondary liability or misuse doctrines, which
have evolved based on a presumed relationship between the regimes.
The Article extends recent arguments that the Progress Clause
should be read as a unified power intended to promote the progress of
science and useful arts. Based on the structural similarities of the
Second Amendment and Progress Clause, I argue that the structural
analysis employed by the Supreme Court in D.C. v. Heller is also
applicable to the Progress Clause. Based on the Heller analysis, the
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Western District of Pennsylvania. LL.M. in Intellectual Property Law, The George Washington
University Law School, 2011; J.D., the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2010. The
article is adapted from the author’s thesis, submitted to partially satisfy the requirements of a
Master of Laws degree at The George Washington University Law School. That same earlier
version of this article received the first place award in the Marcus B. Finnegan Competition for
the best paper on an intellectual property topic by a student at The George Washington
University Law School. I would like to thank my thesis advisor, John Duffy, for his input,
advice, and support. His input has dramatically improved this article. I would also like to thank
Michael Madison and Adam Mossoff for providing comments and recommendations and Ken
Rodriguez, GWU’s Law Librarian for Intellectual Property Law, for his help finding some of
the more obscure sources cited in this paper. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation for
the comments and criticisms I received during the October 2011 Washington, D.C. Legal
History Roundtable. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author. Any mistakes
are, of course, my own.
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Article concludes that a unitary reading is, indeed, the proper reading
of the Progress Clause.
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INTRODUCTION

The Progress Clause of the Constitution gives Congress the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”1 This Clause is
the source of Congress’s power to enact the patent and copyright
laws.2 The Supreme Court has been turning increasingly to the
Progress Clause to answer many important questions in intellectual
property law.3
In 1949, Karl Lutz published an influential article that argued
that the Progress Clause should be given a distributive reading.4 Since
that time, the distributive reading has been embraced by scholars, the
legislature, and the courts.5 The distributive reading extracts two
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309, 393 (2008) (“Both
copyright and patent law emanate from the same source: Congress’s power under the Copyright
and Patent Clause . . . .”).
3. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231-57 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(discussing the “constitutional moorings” of patent law in assessing patent eligibility);
accord, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991) (finding
that originality is a constitutionally-mandated requirement in copyright law); Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 192-93 (2003) (addressing the constitutionality of copyright term); Golan v.
Holder, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011) (granting certiorari to determine whether Congress may
constitutionally remove certain works from the public domain pursuant to the Berne
Convention). See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Golan, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (No. 10-545).
4. See Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 51 (1949) [hereinafter Lutz, Patents and
Science]; see also Karl B. Lutz, Are the Courts Carrying Out Constitutional Public Policy on
Patents?, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 766, 789 (1952) [hereinafter Lutz, Public Policy] (claiming
that, if lawyers had looked to history, “they would have found that the word ‘science’ belongs
with the copyright clause . . . .”).
5. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57
UCLA L. REV. 421, 463-64 (2009) [hereinafter Oliar, Convention]. Professor Oliar points to
several sources for his conclusion on scholars. Id. at 463 n.167 (citing 1 DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS § OV[3] (Matthew Bender ed. 2011) (“The clause intermixes copyright
and patent concepts. The patent concepts are ‘useful arts’, ‘inventors’ and ‘discoveries.’”); 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] n.11.2 (Matthew
Bender rev. ed. 2011) (1963) (generally associating “science”, “authors” and “writings”);
Kenneth J. Burchfiel, The Constitutional Intellectual Property Power: Progress of Useful Arts
and the Legal Protection of Semiconductor Technology, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 473, 501
(1988); Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393 (1960)).
Likewise for the legislature, Oliar points to several sources. Id. at 464 n.168 (citing, H. COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, REVISION OF TITLE 35, UNITED STATES CODE “PATENTS,” H.R. REP. NO.
82-1923, at 4 (2d Sess. 1952); S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REVISION OF TITLE 35, UNITED
STATES CODE, S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 3 (2d Sess. 1952)). For court decisions, Oliar cites, for
example, Eldred v. Ashcroft and In re Comiskey. Id. at 464 n.169 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 192-93 (2003) (“The [Progress Clause] provides as to copyrights: ‘Congress shall
have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing [to Authors] for limited
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separate powers from the Progress Clause.6 The first is the copyright
power: to promote the progress of science by securing for limited
times to authors the exclusive right to their respective writings.7 The
second is the patent power: to promote the progress of the useful arts
by securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive right to their
discoveries.8
How the Progress Clause is read dictates the answers to many
questions in patent and copyright law. For example, the distributive
reading’s requirement that patents only apply to useful arts has
contributed to the denial of patent protection for some computer
programs9 and business methods.10 With respect to copyright, the
“functional” aspects of otherwise clearly expressive works have been
denied protection, in some cases resulting in the entire work being
denied copyright protection.11
This article responds to Lutz’s arguments. Through historical
and constitutional examination, the article concludes that the
distributive reading is not correct. To this end, it extends the
arguments first put forth by Professor Dotan Oliar, wherein he
suggests that the current reading of the Progress Clause “rests on
shaky grounds,”12 and describes the reading as “indefensible.”13
Times . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings.”); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (“[The Progress Clause] limit[s] the subject matter eligible for patent protection to the
‘useful Arts.’”)).
6. See Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 51.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Compare Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 63 (1972), and Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 584 (1978) (both denying protection to computer program algorithms), with Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 175 (1981) (granting patent protection to a computer program that
resulted in a physical transformation of rubber).
10. Although the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010), did not directly address the Constitution, the decision is clearly rooted in the current
understanding that patent law is limited to “useful arts.” The Court declined to grant patent
protection to a business method because it was an “abstract idea.” Id. at 3230. However, the
Court also implicitly recognized that a business method clearly falls within the language of the
Patent Act. See id. at 3226 (acknowledging that the statutory definition of “process” is quite
broad). If not due to the statutory language, the restriction against patenting abstract ideas must
be constitutional.
11. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (denying
protection to plaintiff’s work because it was an uncopyrightable “method of operation”); Brandir
Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying copyright
protection to a bicycle rack where the expressive elements were dictated by “utilitarian”
considerations).
12. Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 469.
13. Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1823
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Instead, he proposes what I refer to herein as the “unitary reading” of
the Progress Clause. Under this reading, “science” and “useful arts”
are not the separate domains of copyright and patent as they are under
the dominant reading today. Rather than suggesting that the unitary
reading is simply the better solution, however, I suggest that the
Supreme Court’s recent analysis of the Second Amendment in
District of Columbia v. Heller14 actually mandates the reading
Professor Oliar suggests.
The Heller decision was driven by a combination of historical
and structural analysis. As this Article explains, the structural
similarities between the Second Amendment and the Progress Clause
warrant the application of the Heller framework to the Progress
Clause. Based on this conclusion, the Article then engages in the
same historical/structural analysis as the Supreme Court did in Heller.
The Article then offers some observations based on this analysis.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the history and
emergence of the distributive reading, and explains its theoretical
grounding. Part III discusses how the Supreme Court’s recent analysis
of the Second Amendment applies to the Progress Clause. Part IV
presents the history of the progress laws, and Part V describes how
this history, under any mechanism of constitutional construction,
yields the conclusion that the unitary reading is the most appropriate
reading of the Progress Clause. Part VI concludes.
II. THE DISTRIBUTIVE READING
The first mention of the distributive reading of which the author
is aware was made by Justice Marshall in Evans v. Jordan.15 Justice
Marshall’s reference is made without citation or explanation, so its
basis is difficult to ascertain. The next mention, and first with
explanation, was made in passing, in the dissent of a mid-nineteenth
century Supreme Court copyright decision.16 Despite this deep
history, the dominance of the distributive reading of the Progress
Clause is a relatively recent development in patent law.17 It appears to
have gone unmentioned after that Supreme Court decision in 1834

(2006) [hereinafter Oliar, Making Sense].
14. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
15. Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813). Because this case offers the
distributive reading without explanation, it does little to help explain the basis for the reading.
16. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 684 (1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
17. See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 463-64 (describing Lutz, Patents and Science,
supra note 4, as the article that initially observed the distributive reading).
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until it was once again proposed in 1925.18 Even then, the distributive
reading went largely unrecognized by the legal community.19
The distributive reading, in its present form, “was propagated by
an influential article and consequently adopted by practically all
members of the legal community . . . and has become the accepted
wisdom regarding the textual structure of the Clause.”20 This Part
traces the evolution of the theory from its roots to its final form in
order to ascertain the interpretive underpinnings of the distributive
reading.
A. Justice Thompson’s Dissent in Wheaton v. Peters
Justice Thompson first explained the distributive reading in his
dissent in the famous 1834 Supreme Court copyright decision
Wheaton v. Peters.21 He addressed the debate over the definition of
the word “securing” in the Progress Clause.22 The discussion revolved
around whether copyright was entirely statutory, or whether there was
a common law copyright in the United States.23 The Court held that
there was a common law right to unpublished works,24 but that there
was no such right in published works.25
Justice Thompson used the “distributive” reading of the Progress
Clause to distinguish between the origins of copyright and patent.26
His proposition seems largely rooted in the fact that patent and
copyright were legislated differently from the outset.27 Justice
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See RICHARD C. DE WOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 15 (1925).
See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 463-64.
Id.
Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 684 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
See generally id.
See generally id.
See id. at 657.
That an author at common law has a property in his manuscript . . . cannot be
doubted; but this is a very different right from that which asserts a perpetual and
exclusive property in the future publication of the work, after the author shall
have published it to the world.

Id.
25. See id. at 661 (“Congress, then, by this act, instead of sanctioning an existing right, as
contended for, created it.”).
26. See id. at 684 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
It has been argued at the bar, that as the promotion of the progress of science and
the useful arts, is here united in the same clause in the constitution, the rights of
authors and inventors were considered as standing on the same footing; but this, I
think, is a non sequitur.
Id.
27. See id. (“Th[e Progress Clause] is to be construed distributively, and must have been
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Thompson believed that the statutes themselves spoke to a difference
between the laws.28 The statutes indicated that patent law was created
solely by statute,29 whereas the copyright laws merely secured an
existing right.30
B. Richard De Wolf and Karl Lutz
The next step in the evolution of the distributive reading, taken
almost a century after the first, went relatively unnoticed. In 1925,
Richard De Wolf made an observation “which appear[ed] not to have
had the attention of any court.”31 He noted that the Progress Clause
was “an example of the balanced style of composition so much used
in the days of the colonial worthies.”32 Further, he said, the word
“science,” as used when the Constitution was adopted, meant learning
generally, not the natural sciences we think of today.33 Based on the
language and structure of the Progress Clause, De Wolf concluded
that it must have been intended to provide separately for science and
useful arts.34
Although De Wolf’s proposal went largely unnoticed, the
distributive reading was apparently more appealing in 1949. That year
saw the publication of the first of a pair of influential articles by Karl
B. Lutz35 that would lead to the emergence of the distributive reading
as the “accepted wisdom regarding the textual structure of the
clause.”36
Lutz presented the distributive reading with the same
justification as De Wolf—namely, the balanced sentence.37 He added
further support to his reading by noting that Thomas Jefferson had
himself used the word “science” to mean general learning, albeit after

so understood; for when congress came to execute this power by legislation, the subjects are
kept distinct, and very different provisions are made respecting them.”).
28. See id.
29. Id. Justice Thompson argues that then-current patent statutes “clearly imply that the
whole exclusive right is created by the [statute]”. Id.
30. Id. at 685 (“All the laws on [copyright] purport to be made for securing to authors
and proprietors such copyright.”).
31. DE WOLF, supra note 18, at 14.
32. Id. at 15.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. The pair of articles comprised Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, and Lutz,
Public Policy, supra note 4.
36. See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 463-64 (describing the Lutz articles as the
impetus for general adoption of the distributive reading).
37. See Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 51.

MILLER

2012]

3/23/2012 11:28 AM

UNITARY PROGRESS CLAUSE

249

the signing of the Constitution.38 Under the balanced sentence
structure, then, copyright was intended to promote the progress of
learning in general while patent was intended to promote the progress
of the useful arts.
Lutz further supported his argument on the basis of an
abandoned bill of unknown substance from the first session of
Congress, which had a title identical to the language of the Progress
Clause.39 The bill passed on its first reading, but died at the
adjournment of the first session.40 At the opening of the second
session of Congress, it was decided that the copyright and patent laws
would be provided for separately, and this separation is offered by
Lutz as justification for the distributive reading of the Progress
Clause.41
Lutz continued in this vein, offering several other observations in
order to account for the distributive reading he proposed. For
example, Representative Burke stated that copyrights could be easily
dealt with, as it was easy to acquire literary property.42 Inventions, on
the other hand, were not as simple a subject as copyrights.43
Lutz also examined the legislative history of the patent laws over
the next century.44 He observed that “Congress only once . . . included
the word ‘science’” in the patent laws, and this inclusion was
accidental.45 This statement, however, is simply incorrect: the word
“science” occurred once in the 1793 Patent Act,46 which replaced the
original Act passed only three years earlier, and it appeared twice in
the 1836 Patent Act.47 The 1836 amendment not only retained the
original reference to “science,” but also added an additional
reference.48 This tends to indicate that the inclusion of the word
“science” was not the accident Lutz contends. Lutz further stated that
no evidence from the Constitutional Convention indicated that patents
38. Id. at 51-52 (noting that Jefferson had, in 1799, referred to “government, religion,
morality, and every other science.”) (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 52. This bill was designated H.R. 10 but no further information about the bill is
available from direct sources. Edward C. Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: the Creation
of the Patent Act of 1790, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 462-63 (1997).
40. Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 52.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 53.
45. Id.
46. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (1793).
47. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §§ 6, 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119-20 (1836).
48. See id.
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were intended to extend from the “traditional field” of useful arts into
“science.”49
Given the timing of Lutz’s publication, it seems quite plausible
that this widespread acceptance—after the same position had been put
forth twice before—was rooted largely in the prevailing anti-patent
sentiment of the period. Perhaps the acceptance of this reading at this
point in time should have been questioned, as the courts of this era
were notorious for their anti-patent sentiment.50 Justice Jackson
described the general disposition best: “the only patent that is valid is
one which th[e Supreme] Court has not been able to get its hands
on.”51
Justice Jackson was not exaggerating. From around the mid1930s to around 1950, the Supreme Court found patent after patent
invalid.52 The Court even made sure to open the door to the
government invalidating patents under the guise of actions under the
Sherman Antitrust Act, even though the “issue need not be decided to
dispose of th[e] case” in which that door was opened.53

49.

Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 54.
Certainly there is nothing in the historical background to provide the
Constitutional Convention with a motive for suddenly expanding the AngloAmerican concept of patents to include “science” as we use that term today.
Lacking such evidence, we must assume that the Convention intended to have
patents stick pretty closely to their traditional field as included in the phrase
“useful arts.”
Id. As discussed below, this statement is not entirely correct. There is indeed evidence from the
Constitutional Convention and shortly thereafter that implies an intention that copyrights and
patents both be used to encourage the progress of science and the useful arts. See infra Part
III.B.
50. See George E. Frost, Judge Rich and the 1952 Patent Code—A Retrospective, 76 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 343, 343 (1994) (“The Supreme Court . . . was conspicuously
anti-patent and became progressively more hostile through the 1940’s.”). See also ROBERT
PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 8-9 (1992).
51. Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
52. For Supreme Court cases from this period holding patents invalid, see Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 148-54 (1950); Jungerson, 335 U.S. at
561-68; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 128-32 (1948); Dow Chem.
Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 324 U.S. 320, 324, 331 (1945); Universal Oil Prods.
Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 486 (1944); United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith
Co., 317 U.S. 228, 232 (1942); Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S.
477, 486 (1935).
53. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 387 (1948). U.S.
Gypsum had admitted at the trial level that the challenged licensing agreement would violate the
Sherman Act if its patents were invalid. Id. at 386. The government sought to amend its
complaint to allege invalidity, and the trial court had ruled that the government could not do so.
Id. at 387. Although the Supreme Court felt the issue “need not be decided,” it still decided the
issue—and held that the government can attack the validity of patents it had issued. Id.
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The distributive reading inherently restricts the scope of patent
law by withdrawing “science” from its protection. Given the judicial
sentiment against strong patent rights, general acceptance of a
Constitution-based doctrine that withdrew “science” from patent’s
protection should come as no surprise. And it should come as no
surprise that the justifications of a popular theory were accepted with
little examination. Although the De Wolf and Lutz arguments were
limited to patent, it should be noted that, under their reading, the
converse was true as well: copyright could not protect useful arts.
C. Possible Constitutional Justifications for the Modern
Distributive Reading
Justice Thompson’s reading was based in the statutory
provisions for the two laws rather than the constitutional language
authorizing them.54 He did not question the intent of the Framers, but
instead examined the legislature’s understanding of the Progress
Clause.55 He seemingly found enough support in the statutory
separation of the two laws to necessitate a distributive reading under a
form of original understanding.
De Wolf’s argument was rooted in the language and sentence
structure used by the Framers.56 He presumed that, since the balanced
sentence was “so much used” at the time of the framing of the
Constitution, the Framers must have intended the Progress Clause be
read in distribution.57 The Framers’ use of the word “respectively”
seems to support De Wolf’s reading, as it indicates that authors and
inventors are linked exclusively to writings and discoveries. Further,
they had used distinguishable terms—science and useful arts—to
draw a line between what should be protected by copyright and what
should be protected by patent.58
Justice Thompson’s examination of the understanding of the
Clause and De Wolf’s intent-based argument were seemingly
unpersuasive on their own, as the distributive reading was not widely
adopted after either presentation.59 Lutz’s conclusion was merely a
combination of the two prior justifications for the distributive reading.
Although unpersuasive on their own, when combined by Lutz, at the

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 684 (1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
See id.
DE WOLF, supra note 18, at 15.
See id.
See id. at 15-16.
See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 463-64.
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time he combined them, these two arguments became the basis for the
generally accepted reading of the Progress Clause.60 These two
justifications are, admittedly, persuasive.
Given this combination, this article therefore proceeds under the
presumption that some combination of original intent and original
understanding forms the basis for the modern-day distributive
reading. As shown in the next Part, recent Supreme Court
constitutional jurisprudence casts doubt on the propriety of this
simplified historical analysis. After proposing a structure-based
framework for interpreting the Progress Clause, this Article will
present the argument that the unitary reading of the Progress Clause is
in fact the correct reading.
III. THE HELLER FRAMEWORK
Although there is sufficient evidence in the historical record to
support the unitary reading under the Lutz framework,61 this Part
presents a novel explanation of how the structure of the Progress
Clause should affect our understanding of the Clause. Based on the
similarities between the Second Amendment and the Progress Clause,
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Amendment should inform
the analysis of the Progress Clause. This Part only explains why the
Second Amendment analysis should apply; Part V actually engages in
the analysis.
A. The Supreme Court’s Heller Decision
The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”62 In Heller, the
Supreme Court observed that the Second Amendment could be
rephrased, “Because a well regulated Militia is necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms
shall not be infringed.”63
Read this way, it is easy to see what the Court recognized: the
Second Amendment is actually divided into two separate parts.64 The

60. See generally Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 51.
61. See infra Part IV (arguing that historical evidence demonstrates that the Progress
Clause was likely both originally intended and originally understood to be given a unitary
reading).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
63. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008).
64. See id.
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Court referred to these parts as the “prefatory clause” and the
“operative clause.”65 The operative clause gives a command, while
the prefatory clause “does not limit the latter grammatically, but
rather announces a purpose.”66 The Court called this structure “unique
in our Constitution.”67
The Court concluded that the Amendment’s structure should be
used as an interpretive tool.68 Logically, there must be some
connection between the two clauses.69 This connection means that the
prefatory clause may only resolve ambiguities in the operative clause;
it may not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.70 This
concept of limiting a preamble to an explanatory role was established
as early as 171671 and was still well recognized in America
throughout the nineteenth century.72
From this background, the Supreme Court developed a
framework for analysis of the Second Amendment. The Court began
its analysis of the text with the language of the operative clause.73
Once the Court determined the meaning of the operative clause, it
examined the prefatory clause to “ensure that [the Court’s] reading of
the operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose.”74 For
both clauses, the Court examined historical evidence to determine the
ordinary meaning of the language.75 Thus, the Court’s analysis
comprised three steps: (1) determining the meaning of the operative
language; (2) determining the meaning of the prefatory language; and
(3) ensuring that the two interpretations are consistent.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See id. (“Logic demands that there be a link between the stated purpose and the
command.”).
70. See id. at 577-78 (The requirement of a logical connection “may cause a prefatory
clause to resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause . . . . But apart from that clarifying
function, a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.”).
71. See Copeman v. Gallant, (1716) 24 Eng. Rep. 404 (Ch.) 407 (“I can by no means
allow of the notion, that the preamble shall restrain the operation of the enacting clause.”).
72. See JOEL BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR
INTERPRETATION § 51, p. 49 (1882). The force of the rule in favor of the operative clause was
reduced in England in 1826, but in America, “the settled principle of law is that the preamble
cannot control the enacting part of the statute in cases where the enacting part is expressed in
clear, unambiguous terms.” 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.04, at 146 (7th ed. 2007).
73. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 578.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 576.
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This Article does not repeat the Supreme Court’s historical
review. It is sufficient to say that the Court looked beyond American
history, to English precedent from as far back as the 17th and early
18th centuries,76 in order to ascertain the meaning of the relevant
phrases in the Second Amendment.
B. Heller and the Progress Clause
The Supreme Court’s claim that the structure of the Second
Amendment is “unique in our Constitution” is only correct insofar as
the Amendments are concerned. There is one other provision that
shares a similar structure: even Second Amendment scholars have
noted that the Progress Clause shares this structure.77 Intellectual
property scholars and commentators echo substantially the same
sentiment. They have observed that the Progress Clause is unique
among congressional powers because it is the only power that
specifically states its purpose,78 or conversely, that it is the only
power that specifies how that power is to be exercised.79
76. See id. at 592-93 (considering the 1671 Game Act); accord, e.g., id. at 582
(considering English law from 1689); id. at 592 (considering the 1689 Declaration of Rights);
id. at 587 n.10 (citing J. BRYDALL, PRIVILEGIA MAGNATUD APUD ANGLOS 14 (1704)); id. at
587 n.10 (citing J. BOND, A COMPLEAT GUIDE TO JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 43 (1707)); id. at 578
n.3 (citing Copeman, 24 Eng. Rep. at 407).
77. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
95, 227 n.77 (1980) (noting in a discussion of the Second Amendment that in the Progress
Clause, “as almost nowhere else the framers and ratifiers apparently . . . [chose] explicitly to
legislate the goal in terms of which the provision was to be interpreted.”); see also LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 299 n.6 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that purposive
language of the Second Amendment is almost unique in the Constitution, and that “the only
other such language appears in the copyright clause”). Cf. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace
Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 793-94 n.1 (1998) (noting that the Progress Clause
has a similar structure, but distinguishing it because the Progress Clause “deals with
congressional powers rather than individual rights, and because the grammatical relationship
between its subclasses is significantly different” from those of the Second Amendment).
78. See Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and
Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 918 (2010) (“The purpose of patent and copyright legislation is to
‘promote the progress of science and useful arts.’”); see also Case Comment, Second Circuit
Upholds Perpetual Anti-Bootlegging Protection Against Copyright Clause Challenge—United
States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 1455, 1460 (2008)
(describing the Progress Clause as “unique among the enumerated powers of Article I, Section
8, in that its purpose is contained within its text: ‘To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.’”); accord, e.g., 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1:18 (2010); Jeffrey
M. Kuhn, Information Overload at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Reframing the Duty
of Disclosure in Patent Law as a Search and Filter Problem, 13 YALE J. L. & TECH. 90, 92
(2010-2011).
79. See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts:
The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 32 (1994) [hereinafter Walterscheid, Background] (stating
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It should be noted that these provisions are not identical: the
Progress Clause is not exactly comprised of a prefatory and an
operative clause. Technically, because the power granted by the
Clause is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” that
provision both gives a command and announces a purpose.80 Still, the
first provision of the Progress Clause—like the Second Amendment’s
prefatory clause—announces a purpose: to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts.81 Likewise, the second provision of the
Progress Clause—the “securing” clause—explains how to achieve
that purpose. To that end, the second provision gives a command on
how to achieve the purpose of the first provision.
Given the structural similarities between the two provisions, I
propose that the Heller framework should be applied to the Progress
Clause. It is therefore proper to look first to the “operative”82
language in the Progress Clause. This language states that Congress
may “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”83
After determining the meaning of that language, the analysis
turns to the prefatory clause. This language states that the purpose of
the Progress Clause is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.”84 The prefatory clause can only be used to clarify
ambiguity; it cannot be used to expand or contract the scope of the
operative language. After presenting historical evidence relevant to
the Progress Clause in Part IV, Part V of this article will discuss the
that the Progress Clause “is unique among the congressional powers in that it alone specifies a
mode for exercising the particular power, i.e., ‘by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.’”). But see Graham v.
John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) (“The Congress in the exercise of the
patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.”).
The Court construed the “exclusive Right” clause to be a “qualified authority” which was
“limited to the promotion of advances in the ‘useful arts’” by way of the “Progress” clause. Id.
at 5. However, taken in the context of other Article I powers, which all begin with “to . . . ,” it is
clear that the power contained in the Progress Clause is the power “to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts . . . .” See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. In this case, the “exclusive
Right” clause may be limiting, but it is certainly not the actual grant of power.
80. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
81. Arguably, all the powers provided for in Article I, Section 8 specify their purpose.
For example, the purpose of the commerce clause is clearly for Congress to regulate commerce.
See TRIBE, supra note 77, at 298; Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 78, at 917-18.
82. Although I acknowledge that the two sub-clauses in the Progress Clause are not
exactly prefatory and operative, I retain that language for the purposes of this paper so that I
may refer to the Heller analysis. Thus, the “operative” language of the Progress Clause is the
“securing” provision, and the “prefatory” language is the purposive provision.
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
84. Id.
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application of the Heller framework to this evidence.
IV. THE HISTORY OF THE PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAWS
This Part engages in a historical analysis of the prefatory
language of the Progress Clause. This analysis is applicable to both
the originalism-based argument championed by Lutz, as well as the
structure-centric Heller framework.85 The first section presents some
preliminary observations to frame the remainder of the historical
analysis. After these observations, I present and analyze the historical
evidence.
A. Preliminary Observations on the Progress Clause
Before delving into the historical analysis, it is important to
clarify the meanings of several constitutional terms as they are used in
this article. This Section makes several observations in order to
establish the definitions of the six terms relevant to the analysis.
These terms are science, useful arts, authors, inventors, writings, and
discoveries.86 As this Section explains, all six terms will be used
exactly as they are in the distributive reading.
There is little dispute that authors and inventors are directly tied
to writings and discoveries. The Clause appears to dictate, through the
use of the word “respective,” that authors are associated with writings
and inventors with discoveries.87 This understanding is further borne
out by the terms themselves. “One who writes” and “author,” for
example, were synonymous at the time of the Framing. 88 Discoveries
were likewise closely related to inventors.89
The problem, however, is that none of these terms are
susceptible to a concrete definition. Inventions, for example, could be
literary works—the creations of authors.90 Similarly, author is defined
85. I note here that, where Professor Oliar generally limited his historical review to the
Constitutional Convention, see generally Oliar, Convention, supra note 5; Oliar, Making Sense,
supra note 13, I expand my review to include early English precedent in accord with Heller. See
supra note 76 and accompanying text.
86. See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 464.
87. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to secure “to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
88. See NOAH WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 354
(1806) (defining “writer” as “one who writes, an author”).
89. See id. at 87 (defining “discovery” as “the act of discovering, an invention”); id. at
164 (defining “invention” as “a contrivance, discovery, device”).
90. See NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE:
INTENDED TO EXHIBIT: I. THE ORIGIN, AFFINITIES AND PRIMARY SIGNIFICATION OF ENGLISH
WORDS, AS FAR AS THEY HAVE BEEN ASCERTAINED. II. THE GENUINE ORTHOGRAPHY AND
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at times as something very close to inventor.91
Any attempt to define these operative terms is beyond the scope
of this article, so the article will instead operate under a broader
treatment of the language. In accord with the distributive reading, the
article presumes that “authors” and “writings” appropriately fall under
the scope of copyright, while “inventors” and “discoveries” are
appropriate subjects of patent law. The Clause has always been read
in this manner.92 This article therefore declines to define the operative
language in more concrete terms than to say that the language speaks
to copyright and patent, just as it does under the distributive reading.
This Article also uses the prefatory terms, “science” and “useful
arts,” in exactly the same manner as they are used in the distributive
reading. Lutz explained both of these terms: “science,” at the time of
the Framing, meant learning in general.93 Meanwhile, “useful arts”
referred to what we today refer to as “technology.”94 This article
operates under these definitions.
With these definitions in mind, the Heller framework can be
somewhat simplified: the operative language need not be reexamined,
as the language is already generally understood. Moreover, the Article
does not challenge the definitions of the prefatory language. Thus, the
only question is what the relationship is between the prefatory and
operative language. The remainder of this section analyzes this
relationship from a historical perspective.
It is also necessary to address exactly what this Article means
when it uses the term “patent,” especially in the historical context.
The modern legal term, “patent,” is derived from the English Royal
PRONUNCIATION OF WORDS, ACCORDING TO GENERAL USAGE, OR TO JUST PRINCIPLES OF
ANALOGY. III. ACCURATE AND DISCRIMINATING DEFINITIONS, WITH NUMEROUS AUTHORITIES
AND ILLUSTRATIONS. TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED, AN INTRODUCTORY DISSERTATION ON THE
ORIGIN, HISTORY AND CONNECTION OF THE LANGUAGES OF WESTERN ASIA AND OF EUROPE,
AND A CONCISE GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 907 (1828) (defining “invention” as,
among other things, “fiction. Fables are the inventions of ingenious men.”).
91. See id. at 131 (defining “author” as “[o]ne who produces, creates, or brings into being
. . . .”); id. at 907 (defining “inventor” as “one who contrives and produces anything not before
existing.”).
92. See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 486 (1818) (referring to the Progress
Clause as the foundation of Congress’s power to grant patents); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33
U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 660 (1834) (describing the 1790 Copyright Act as passed in “pursuance” of
Congress’s Progress Clause power).
93. See Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 51.
94. Id. at 54 (stating that “‘useful arts,’ as used in the Constitution . . . is best represented
in modern language by the word ‘technology’” and defining “technology” as “[a]ny practical art
utilizing scientific knowledge, as horticulture or medicine; applied science contrasted with pure
science.”).
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practice of granting special privileges through open letters known as
“letters patent.”95 A letter patent was a legal mechanism employed by
the Crown to grant personal privileges, such as commercial
monopolies for printing books or manufacturing commodities,96 in
furtherance of Royal policies, such as promoting the economic
development of the English Realm.97 These letters patent—whether
granting industrial or printing privileges—did not secure the property
rights in inventions that patents do today. Although these early
English letters patent are not patents in the same sense as we use that
word today, it is undeniable that they are the ancestors to modern-day
patents98 and copyrights,99 and they clearly informed the
understanding of patents and copyrights in the Founding Era.
Therefore, these antiquated legal doctrines are arguably still relevant
in informing our understanding of the laws enacted under the Progress
Clause today.
B. Pre-Ratification History of Patent and Copyright Laws
The Progress Clause of the Constitution was not created in a
vacuum. The forebears to patent and copyright laws had existed for
centuries before the United States began its transition to the federal
form of government.100 Indeed, the language of the Progress Clause
hints at the Framers’ intent to follow English practices.101 Due to the
presumptive familiarity of delegates to the Constitutional Convention
with English precedent,102 these precedents are a good starting point

95. Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600-1836: How Patents Became
Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 185 (2004) (citing George Ramsey,
The Historical Background of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 6, 6-9 (1936)) (“A patent was a
creature of royal prerogative. It was based on case-specific policy decisions of the monarch to
confer particular privileges on a certain individual in order to promote some economic, social, or
political goal.”). See also Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An
Intellectual History, 1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1259 (2001) [hereinafter Mossoff,
Development].
96. See infra Part IV.B.
97. See Mossoff, Development, supra note 95, at 1259.
98. See id.
99. See infra Part IV.B.1.b.
100. See Walterscheid, Background, supra note 79, at 2.
101. See id. at 34 (the language in the Progress Clause seems to have been guided by a
“desire to follow the English practice of granting exclusive rights through the issuance of
patents or a similar device.”).
102. See id. at 37 (stating that delegates were familiar with the Statute of Monopolies); see
also Morgan Sherwood, The Origins and Development of the American Patent System, 71 AM.
SCI. 500, 500 (1983) (suggesting Framers adopted patent system due to familiarity with English
precedent).
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in determining what the public understanding and Framers’ intentions
may have been.103
1. English Precedent
a. “Industrial” Letters Patent and the Statute of
Monopolies
In 1331, King Edward III granted the first industrial “letter
patent” to John Kempe of Flanders.104 This and letters patent like it
were granted as protection for foreigners willing to come to England
to train English subjects in the foreigners’ trades.105 Kempe, for
instance, was a weaver by trade.106 The patent to Kempe was the first
step in a “deliberate and vigorous policy to expand English industry
which Edward III and his successors pursued with excellent
results.”107
British monarchs did not begin issuing letters patent for domestic
manufacturing within England until the mid-sixteenth century.108 The
first such domestic industrial patent was granted to Henry Smyth in
1552 for the production of Normandy glass.109 Following such
practice, Queen Elizabeth I granted fifty-five patents during her reign
103. For detailed histories of the English precedents, see generally Walterscheid,
Background, supra note 79; Tyler T. Ochoa and Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the
Patent and Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909 (2002) [hereinafter
Ochoa & Rose]. Both provide significant background on the precedent relevant to the Progress
Clause. But see generally Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About
Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953
(2007) (questioning the veracity of some of the historical sources and legal terms of art relied on
by Walterscheid, Ochoa, and Rose).
104. See Mossoff, Development, supra note 95, at 1259 (citing Pat. 5 Edw. III, p. I, m. 25
(1331)).
105. See id.
106. LIEN BICH LUU, IMMIGRANTS AND THE INDUSTRIES OF LONDON, 1500-1700 54
(1967).
107. Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, 41 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 615, 625 (1959).
108. See Mossoff, Development, supra note 95, at 1260.
109. See, e.g., id.; Klitzke, supra note 107, at 629. The patent stated that Smyth was to
introduce:
[B]rode glasse of like fasshion and goodes to that which is commonly called
Normandy glasse which shall not only be a great commoditie to our said realme
and dominions but also bothe in the price of the glasse aforesaid and otherwise a
benefite to our subjectes and besydes that dyvers of theym maye be sett to worke
and get their lyvying and in tyme learne and be hable to make said glasse them
selfe and so from tyme to tyme instructe the others in that science and feate.
Id. (quoting Davies, Further Light on the Case of Monopolies, 48 L. Q. REV. 396
(1932)).
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over the latter half of the sixteenth century.110 At least one of these
early patents explicitly referred to “science” as the foundation for the
protected innovation.111
Challenges raised to some of these patents foreshadowed modern
patent issues. Several cases, for example, implicated what would
evolve into questions of novelty and obviousness.112 As the law
evolved, patents became subject to certain conditions. The patentee
must: (i) work the patent; (ii) not interfere with established industries;
and (iii) train apprentices.113
Despite Queen Elizabeth’s efforts at stimulating domestic
industry,114 and her initial adherence to the conditions for patent
grant,115 she began to use the patent power in a manner inconsistent
with the original purpose or conditions of patent.116 As she saw it,
“her Prerogative Royall may not be called in question for the
valliditie of the letters patents.”117 One of the most egregious
110. Mossoff, Development, supra note 95, at 1261. For a list of patents granted by Queen
Elizabeth, see Edward Wyndham Hulme, The Early History of the English Patent System, in 3
SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 117, 122-138 (Ass’n of Am. Law
Schools ed., 1909) [hereinafter Hulme, Early History].
111. See Hulme, Early History, supra note 110 at 137 (citing Edward Wright’s patent for
“[a]nother water-raising device, obtained ‘by long and painful study of the mathematical
sciences’”). Admittedly, the actual device is clearly among the “useful arts,” but the fact remains
that the patent’s language expressly states that it was a work of science being protected.
112. See, e.g., 17 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 21011 (2d ed. 1793) (citing Mathey’s case, Noy 113). Viner’s Abridgement summarized Matthey’s
case thusly:
So where a patent was granted to A. for the sole making of knives with bone
hafts, and plates of lattin; because, as the patents suggested, he brought the first
use thereof from beyond seas; yet nevertheless, when the wardens of the
company of cutlers shewed before some of the council, and some learned in the
law, that they used to make knives before, though not with such hafts; and
that such a light difference or invention should be no cause to restrain them;
thereupon he could never have benefit of this patent, although he laboured very
greatly therein.
Id. It is worth noting that the actual date of Mathey’s case is unknown. What is known,
though, is that the case addressed Elizabeth’s 25th patent, granted in 1571. See Mossoff,
Development, supra note 95, at 1262 n.29. Following Mathey’s case, Bircot’s case
resolved that “no old manufacture in use before can be prohibited.” 3 EDWARDO COKE,
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 183 (1797).
113. See Mossoff, Development, supra note 95, at 1261.
114. See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Laws:
Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 855 (1994) [hereinafter
Walterscheid, Evolution].
115. See Mossoff, Development, supra note 95, at 1262.
116. See id. at 1264-65.
117. Walterscheid, Evolution, supra note 114, at 863 (citing E. BURKE INLOW, THE
PATENT GRANT 21 (1950)). The quoted text is originally from 32 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL
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instances of Queen Elizabeth’s abuse was a patent granted to Edward
Darcy in 1598 for the manufacture, importation and sales of playing
cards.118 The King’s Bench held the patent invalid in the landmark
case Darcy v. Allen119 (“The Case of Monopolies”). The basis of that
holding was that a patent should not be used to withdraw from general
access something already available to the public.120 This holding was
emphasized in another famous case a short time later.121
English monarchs continued to abuse the patent power after The
Case of Monopolies was decided,122 and the Statute of Monopolies
was enacted in 1623 as a response to the monarchy’s ongoing
abuse.123 The Statute broadly declared monopolies invalid, and this
Statute was regarded as “the first and final source of authority” on the
subject of patents in England (and its colonies) from the seventeenth
century onwards.124
The Statute of Monopolies included several exceptions where
monopolies might be found valid. The most commonly cited
exception with respect to patent law stated that a monopoly could be
appropriately granted for the “sole working or makinge of any manner
of new Manufactures.”125 While this exception made it possible for
the Crown to continue to grant “industrial” patents through this

237 (1601).
118. See Hulme, Early History, supra note 110, at 137-38.
119. Darcy v. Allen, (1603) 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B.) 1133.
120. See id. at 1139. Allen’s counsel argued:
[W]here any man by his own charge and industry, or by his own wit or invention
doth bring any new trade into the realm, or any engine tending to the furtherance
of a trade that never was used before; and that for the good of the realm; that in
such cases the King may grant to him a monopoly patent for some reasonable
time, until the subjects may learn the same, in consideration of the good that he
doth bring by his invention to the commonwealth; otherwise not.
Id. See also id. at 1141 (Allen’s counsel arguing that the patent “doth but take the trade of
making and selling cards from many persons, and giveth that trade to one, which is unlawful.”).
121. See The Clothworkers of Ipswich, (1615) 78 Eng. Rep. 147 (K.B.) 148. Holding that
the King
cannot make a monopoly for that is to take away free-trade, which is the
birthright of every subject . . . . [W]hen the trade is become common, and others
have been bound apprentices in the same trade, there is no reason that such
should be forbidden to use it.
Id.
122. See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 103, at 679; accord Mossoff, Development, supra note
95, at 1270.
123. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 & 22 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.).
124. Edward Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System under the Prerogative
and at Common Law, 12 L. Q. REV. 141, 142 (1896) [hereinafter Hulme, Prerogative].
125. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 & 22 Jac. I, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.).
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exception,126 the story of patent is not limited to this type of patent, or
this exception in the Statute.
b. Printing Patents and the Stationers’ Company
Two other exceptions to the Statute of Monopolies are relevant
to the history of the Progress Clause, though it appears that they are
not given the same deference as the manufacturing exception in patent
scholarship. These exceptions applied to Crown-chartered guilds127
and to printing patents.128 The background of these two exceptions is
just as pertinent to the Progress Clause as that of industrial letters
patent, especially because they arose under the “first and final source”
on English patent law but were, in large part, two copyright
exceptions. Along with the exception for manufactures,129 these
exceptions were a first step toward both a modern form of intellectual
property right and a distinction between patent and copyright.130
The Stationers’ Company was one of many Crown-chartered
guilds in sixteenth-century London.131 The history of the guild runs to
1403, but it was not until May 4, 1557 that the Stationers’ Company
(“Company”) was chartered.132 Although the Company’s power was
generally limited geographically, its charter gave it nearly a complete
monopoly over printing.133 This power made the Stationers’ Company
the “focal point of the history of copyright.”134 This focus developed
through the Stationers’ clever exploitation of two privileges: the
“copyright” developed under the Stationers’ charter and the royal
printing patent.
Stated succinctly, the Stationers’ copyright was a right
recognized by members of the Company that entitled one who
published a work to prevent unauthorized printing of the same
work.135 The key point to be taken from the Stationers’ copyright at
this juncture is that, after its early years, it became wholly

126. Id.
127. See id. at § 9.
128. See id. at § 10.
129. See id. at § 6.
130. As is discussed in the remainder of this section, Sections 9 and 10 of the Statute of
Monopolies created exceptions to the ban on monopolies that would eventually evolve into
copyright.
131. See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 28 (1968).
132. Id. at 28-29.
133. See id. at 32.
134. Id. at 28.
135. Id. at 43-44.
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independent from the printing patent, and that it was a monopoly
within the “Crown-chartered guilds” exception to the Statute of
Monopolies—the statute typically treated as addressing patent law.
The other relevant exception to the Statute of Monopolies was
the exception for printing patents. Despite the Stationers’ efforts to
control printing through their copyright, the first book printed with
sovereign privilege was printed in either 1512 or 1518.136 One of
these appears to be the first granted printing patent.137 Notably, both
of these domestic English printing patents were granted almost half a
century before the Smyth patent, the first domestic English industrial
patent.138
Printing patents came in two flavors. General printing patents
covered entire classes of works, like law books, while a particular
printing patent covered a specific work.139 Particular printing patents
therefore limited the reproduction of specific works, such as A B C
with the Little Catechism140 and Cosmographical Glass.141
Printing patents were granted under the same royal prerogative
as industrial patents, and indeed, there appears to be little to
distinguish between the two patents, save their subject matter.142
Printing patents appear to be merely an aspect of the original patent
system, which was intended to encourage industrial development.143 It
can then be said that printing patents, on texts, were used with the
purpose of promoting the progress of useful arts.
It appears that this close relationship was recognized by the
Stationers’ Company. The Company apparently viewed the playing-

136. See THOMAS LINACRE, LINACRI PROGYMNASMATA GRAMMATICES VULGARIA
colophon (London, Johan Rastell c. 1512).
Emprynted in London on ye sowth syde of paulys by John Rastell with ye
priuylege of our most suuerayn lord kyng Henry the. viii. grauntyd to the
compyler therof. that noo man in thys hys realme sell none but such as the same
copyler makyth pryntyd for ye space of ii. yeere.
Id.; PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 42 (stating that the first printing patent was granted in 1518).
137. It seems likely that the Linacre patent was the first. See H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui,
What History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-At-Law
Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1213 (2008) (stating that “[t]he earliest exclusive
printing privilege of which there is any record in England” is the Rastell/Linacre patent).
138. The Smyth patent was granted in 1552. See Klitzke, supra note 106, at 629.
139. See PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 79.
140. See id. at 40.
141. See id. at 79.
142. See id. at 82 (it is “difficult to distinguish the basis of the printing patent from the
basis of the industrial patent.”); see also id. at 84.
143. See id. at 82.
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cards patent in The Case of Monopolies as a printing patent, despite
the fact that suit was brought as if the patent was industrial.144 This
belief was echoed by at least one modern scholar, who called the
patent at issue in The Case of Monopolies a “fusion” of printing and
industrial patents.145
Although printing patents were in fact patents, there was a great
deal of overlap between printing patents and copyrights. A 1582
report on printing patents referred to the rights possessed by printing
patentees as “Copies.”146 The Stationers’ copyright also controlled
“copies.”147 The major difference was that the printing patent was a
copyright granted by the sovereign,148 while the Stationers’ copyright
was a private copyright.149 This distinction resulted in many of the
other differences.150 Still, the fact remains that the printing patent and
the Stationers’ copyright performed essentially the same function on
essentially the same subject matter.151
It actually appears that the Stationers’ copyright would not have
adequately prevented competitive publication without the printing
patent.152 Even as the Stationers developed their copyright, they
actively pursued legislation that would allow them to patent copies of
books.153 For a time after the Stationers’ copyright became an
established privilege, the printing patent remained the preferred form
of protection.154 It appears that if patent law had not laid the
foundation for copyright, copyright would not exist, at least in the
form it does today.
Even after copyright became an established privilege, printing
patents were used to prevent unauthorized copying. 155 Cases
frequently arose where the printing patent and Stationers’ copyright

144. See id. at 84-85.
145. Id. at 84.
146. Id. at 36.
147. See id. at 46-47.
148. Id. at 78.
149. Id. at 79.
150. See id. at 79.
151. See id. at 80.
152. See id. at 90-91.
153. See id. at 104. In 1584, the Stationers initiated their efforts to convince the Star
Chamber to secure protection by legislation. Id. In 1586, a petition was submitted to the Star
Chamber entitled “The Arguments of the Patentees in Favour of Privileges for Bookes.” The
petition specifically referred to “Authors” and “Copie[s].” Id. at 104-105.
154. See PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 78.
155. See id.
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were held by different parties.156 In such instances, the printing patent
prevailed.157
The Stationers’ copyright survived the enactment of the Statute
of Monopolies under the exception for Crown-chartered guilds,158
while printing patents survived under their own exception.159 This
history shows that one of the two English statutes relevant to the
Progress Clause actually supported the use of patents to restrict
dissemination of literary copies in order to induce industrial
development. At its most basic, the printing patent acted as a
copyright.160 Thus, patent was, from its very first domestic use in
England, applied to what the Framers called “science,” or what is
called “expression” today, yet it was still a patent. Furthermore,
patents on expression were understood to promote industrial
progress.161
c. The Statute of Anne
It is only necessary to briefly address the Statute of Anne here.
Unlike the Statute of Monopolies and the associated history, the
Statute of Anne provides little insight into the constitutional question
at issue. As enacted, the Statute of Anne only applied to the
Stationers’ copyright and the new “statutory” copyright created by the
Statute.162
While it appears that the Statute of Anne was essentially a
codification of the Stationers’ copyright that provided a limited term
for the copyright,163 printing patents were not changed by the Statute
of Anne. Admittedly, the printing patents were of relatively little
importance by the time the Statute of Anne was passed in 1709,164 but
printing patents were still being successfully enforced in the late
seventeenth century165 and they were still being asserted well into the
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 & 22 Jac. I, c. 3, § 9 (Eng.).
159. See id. at § 10.
160. See PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 80.
161. Both the Crown and the Stationers’ Company viewed printing patents as mechanisms
for encouraging industrial progress. See id. at 82 (noting that the general purpose of printing
patents was to encourage industrial development); cf. id. at 109 (discussing the pooling of
printing patents to provide economic incentives to poor members of the Company).
162. See PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 143.
163. See id. at 146-47.
164. Id. at 144.
165. See, e.g., Co. of Stationers v. Seymour, (1667) 86 Eng. Rep. 865 (K.B.); Co. of
Stationers v. Parker, (1685) 90 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B.) 107-08 (citing Roper v. Streater (1670));
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eighteenth century.166 As late as 1775, in Carnan’s Case, printing
patents were asserted by the Stationers and the defendants asserted a
copyright defense to the patent claim.167 Defendants also referred to
patents during their argument.168 The court, like the Stationers,
referred only to patents.169 All of this shows that there was no bright
line between patents and copyrights, even in 1775, just a few short
years before the Progress Clause was ratified.
d. Conclusions to be Drawn from English Precedent
There are several important points to be gleaned from this
history of English precedent. First is the fact that patent law has, since
its beginning, been applied to expressive content. Equally noteworthy
is the fact that the first English patent was not an industrial patent but
a printing patent,170 and this patent was intended to promote
industry.171 Printing patents like the first survived unchanged through
major patent and copyright legislation.172 Perhaps most importantly,
these patents were still being actively enforced around the time the
Constitution was being written.173 It is therefore unacceptable to
ignore the history and existence of printing patents in interpreting the
Progress Clause.
2. American Precedent
All of the above demonstrates that there was significant overlap
in subject matter between English patents and copyrights. The history
of English law supports application of patent law to what the Framers
called science, not just the useful arts.174 Pre-constitutional American
history also supports this conclusion, as well as the corollary that
copyright promotes the progress of useful arts.

Co. of Stationers v. Lee, (1682-1683) 89 Eng. Rep. 927 (K.B.) 928 (citing Mayo v. Hill (1672)).
166. See generally Stationers’ Co. v. Carnan, (1775) 96 Eng. Rep. 590 (K.B.).
167. See id. at 591-92 (arguing that the asserted patents lacked any “of the true grounds, on
which a prerogative copyright can be founded.”).
168. See id. at 592.
169. See id. at 592-93.
170. The first printing patent was granted in the 1510’s. See LINACRE, supra note 136
(claiming a printing privilege in 1512); PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 86-87 (stating that the
first printing patent was granted in 1518).
171. PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 82.
172. See Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 & 22 Jac. 1, c. 3, §§ 9-10 (Eng.).
173. See generally Carnan, 96 Eng. Rep. 590.
174. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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Pre-Constitutional Colonial and State Progress
Laws

The Progress Clause was drafted “against the immediate
backdrop of the Articles of Confederation, but within the overall
framework of the English, colonial, and state practices regarding
patents and copyrights.”175 Having already discussed the English
framework, this Section discusses the colonial and state practices and
their relevance to interpretation of the Progress Clause.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress
did not have the authority to issue copyrights or patents.176 After
several authors petitioned the Continental Congress on the topic of
literary property,177 a committee was appointed “to consider the most
proper means of cherishing genius and useful arts throughout the
United States by securing to the authors or publishers of new books
their property in such works.”178 The committee was “persuaded that
nothing is more properly a man’s own than the fruit of his study, and
that the protection of literary property would greatly tend to
encourage genius, to promote useful discoveries, and to the general
extension of the arts and commerce.”179 In response to the
committee’s findings, the Continental Congress urged states to secure
copyrights to authors or publishers.180
Some states, including Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
Maryland, had adopted copyright laws prior to this Resolution,181 but

175. Walterscheid, Background, supra note 79, at 3.
176. See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 103, at 686.
177. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922) (The
May 2, 1783 installment makes note of “sundry papers and memorials from different persons on
the subject of literary property” that were submitted to Congress).
178. NATIONAL ARCHIVES, PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, no. 36, II, fol. 11314, reprinted in BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 112
(1967) (emphasis added).
179. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 177, at 326 (emphasis
added).
180. See Resolution of May 2, 1783, reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1783-1906 11 (Thorvald Solberg ed., 2d ed. 1906) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT
ENACTMENTS]. The Resolution encouraged states:
[T]o secure to the authors or publishers of any new books not hitherto printed . . .
the copy right of such books for a certain time not less than fourteen years from
the first publication; and to secure to the said authors, if they shall survive the
term first mentioned, . . . the copy right of such books for another term of time
not less than fourteen years.
Id.
181. See Act of Jan. 29, 1783 (Conn.), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note
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every state had the authority to exercise copyright laws.182 Among
those states that adopted copyright provisions, North Carolina’s
Copyright Act of 1785 stated in its preamble that the “security of
literary property must greatly tend to encourage genius, to promote
useful discoveries, and to the general extension of arts and
commerce.”183 South Carolina took the Resolution a step further by
including a general patent law in its copyright statute.184 The other
states did not do so, instead opting to enact individual patents.185
Although this pre-Constitutional evidence is not conclusive, it
does show that the Continental Congress and several of the states
thought that copyright could be used to promote the useful arts.
Furthermore, the committee appointed to address the copyright issue
used several of the constitutional terms—a point that is made more
relevant, as will be shown, by the fact that James Madison was one of
the committee members.186
b. The Constitutional Convention
Further support for a unitary reading of the Progress Clause is
found in the Constitutional Convention. Discussions at the
Constitutional Convention of what became the Progress Clause may
indicate that the Framers intended the clause to be unitary. Because
the Progress Clause was not debated after introduction,187 much of
this section is derived from the background proposals of the two
people most closely associated with the intellectual property-related
powers: James Madison and Charles Pinckney.
The Federal Convention convened on May 25, 1787 in

180, at 11-13; Act of Mar. 17, 1783 (Mass.), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note
180, at 14-15; and Act of April 21, 1783 (Md.), reprinted in COPYRIGHT
ENACTMENTS, supra note 180, at 15-16.
182. See 1 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
FROM THEIR DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE CLOSE OF THEIR CIVIL WAR 531 (Joseph
C. Clayton ed., 1896) (stating that every state had authority to exercise copyright law).
183. See Act of Nov. 19, 1785 (N.C.), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note
180, at 25.
184. See Act of Mar. 26, 1784 (S.C.), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note
180, at 23 (emphasis added).
185. See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 57-58 (2002).
186. See JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 176, at 211. The other
members of the committee were Hugh Williamson of North Carolina and Ralph Izard of South
Carolina.
187. See Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution,
17 GEO. L.J. 109, 114 (1929).
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Philadelphia.188 William Jackson, the Convention’s secretary,
recorded an official journal of the proceedings.189 James Madison kept
his own private, more detailed journal as well.190 These journals agree
that intellectual property was not addressed for the first several
months of the Convention,191 and an early draft of the Constitution did
not mention it either.192
Intellectual property powers were first proposed among a list of
twenty powers on August 18, 1787.193 Several of these powers were
quite clearly directed towards improving or encouraging innovation—
including those directed at universities, public institutions, and
rewards or encouragements for innovation.194
Although none of these powers were incorporated into the
Constitution, at least in their initial form, they appear to be the basis
of the eventual Progress Clause.195 This is because the Progress
Clause essentially provides a desirable purpose (promoting progress)
and means for achieving it (by securing rights). This combination of
purpose and means does not appear in any single proposed power.196
Instead, a combination of the proposals by both Charles
Pinckney and James Madison speak to the Progress Clause’s specific
combination of purpose and means. Pinckney and Madison each

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 426.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL (Aug. 6, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 177-89 (Max Farrand ed., 1927).
193. See Convention’s Journal (Aug. 18, 1787), in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1786-1870, H.R. DOC. NO. 529, at 130-31
(2d Sess. 1894).
. . . To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited time
To establish an University
To encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful
knowledge and discoveries . . .
To establish seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts and science .
..
To grant patents for useful inventions
To secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time
To establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of
agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures.
Id. (italics added).
194. See id.; see also Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 447-49.
195. See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 425.
196. See id. at 425; see generally JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note
177.
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proposed separate powers for copyright, patent, education, and
encouragement of innovation.197 Both men’s patent and copyright
powers were exceedingly simple, granting Congress the power to
secure or grant a right with no other guidance or limitation.198 With
the exception of Madison’s education power, the remaining education
and encouragement proposals were all directed at what can readily be
described as the promotion of progress of innovation.199 Pinckney’s
proposals included the encouragement of literature, the arts and
sciences, agriculture, commerce, trade and manufacture.200 Madison’s
included the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.201
Based on the evident relationship between these proposals, it
seems likely that the Progress Clause was a distillation of all eight of
the related powers proposed by Madison and Pinckney.202 If this is so,
it seems inappropriate to completely disjoin copyright and patent
from each other as the distributive reading does. Several of the
proposed powers were directed at subject matter that clearly spans
both copyright and patent.203 One of the common justifications for
patent and copyright is incentivizing innovators,204 and education
clearly speaks to general and technical knowledge. It seems then that
copyright and patent, as embodied in the Progress Clause, were
intended to work together to promote both science and the useful arts.
c. Conclusion from American Precedent
As with the English precedent, several points can be taken
towards understanding the Progress Clause. First is that the
Continental Congress—and especially James Madison—believed that
the progress of useful arts could be promoted by securing copyright to
authors.205 Second, the initially proposed powers which appear to

197. Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 446-47.
198. Madison’s copyright and patent powers, respectively, read: “to secure to literary
authors their copyrights for a limited time,” and “to secure to the inventors of useful machines
and implements the benefits thereof for a limited time.” Id. at 447. Pinckney’s proposals read:
“to secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time,” and “to grant patents for useful
inventions.” Id.
199. See id. at 447; see also Oliar, Making Sense, supra note 13, at 1806.
200. Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 447.
201. Oliar, Making Sense, supra note 13, at 1806.
202. See id. at 1805-10.
203. See, e.g., JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 177, at 326.
204. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use
in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2000).
205. See Resolution of May 2, 1783, reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note
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have evolved into the Progress Clause spoke of encouragement of
broader scope of subject matter than just science or just useful arts.206
This pre-constitutional history evidences what today might be
considered anathema: patent promoting the sciences and copyright
promoting the useful arts.
C. Early Post-Ratification History of American Patent and
Copyright Laws
This section turns to the early post-ratification history of the
Progress Clause. Because this part of the Progress Clause’s history is
relevant to original understanding, it is restricted to a much smaller
temporal window. Specifically, this part addresses early progress
legislation and judicial interpretations.
1. Statutory Language
The first patent and copyright laws were enacted in 1790.207 The
Patent Act was entitled “An Act to promote the progress of useful
Arts.”208 The Copyright Act was named “An Act for the
encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, Charts,
And books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the
times therein mentioned.”209 The name of the 1790 Patent Act appears
to unequivocally support the idea that patents apply only to the useful
arts,210 while the 1790 Copyright Act’s title refers to “learning,” 211
which might be understood as a reference to science.212
The patent laws were amended in 1793.213 The 1790 and 1793
laws were largely the same, save for one major change: the 1793 Act
amended the written description section of the 1790 Act. Where the
1790 Act required that the written description enable a “person skilled
in the art or manufacture” to make the invention,214 the 1793 Act
180, at 11.
206. See JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 177, at 326.
207. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790); Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1
Stat. 124 (1790).
208. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
209. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
210. Titles can be used to assist in understanding a statute. See Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947) (Stating that titles or
headings are to be considered in resolving ambiguity but “cannot limit the plain meaning of the
text.”).
211. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
212. See Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 51.
213. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (1793).
214. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
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required it to enable a “person skilled in the art or science” to make
the invention.215
The addition of “science” to the written description provision is
important for two reasons. First, the amendment essentially used the
language of the entire preamble to the Progress Clause, rather than
just a portion of it.216 The short life of the 1790 Act, added to the fact
that one of the few substantive changes was to replace “manufacture”
with “science,”217 indicates either that the legislature saw this as an
important amendment or, at a minimum, that they viewed “science”
and “manufacture” as analogous.
Second, the structure of the section referring to “science”
indicates a view of science as part of the patent regime. The language
of that section makes clear that the thing invented or discovered is an
“art, machine, or improvement.”218 However, the invention is
promoting an “art or science.”219
While the early copyright acts did not refer to “science” in a
manner similar to the patent law’s reference to useful arts, the
Copyright Act of 1802 did use constitutional language: it protected
any person “who shall invent . . . historical and other prints” or who
“from his own works and inventions” caused the same to be made.220
Copyright continued to refer to invention in copyright laws until
1905.221
Although the 1836 Patent Act was much further removed from
the ratification of the Constitution, and is therefore of less value in
ascertaining original understanding, it is still one of the next most
recent pieces of legislation in determining this original understanding
of the Progress Clause. Like the 1790 Patent Act before it, the 1836
Act explicitly referred to “science” in its written description
section.222 It also added a second reference, this time in the context of
215. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318.
216. Id. Notably, the section never uses the full constitutional phrase “useful arts,” but
instead refers only to arts. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. (“every inventor . . . shall swear . . . that he is the true inventor or discoverer of the
art, machine, or improvement, for which he solicits a patent”).
219. See id. (the written description must “enable any person skilled in the art or science”
to practice the invention).
220. See Copyright Act of 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (1802) (repealed 1831).
221. See Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 2, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 436, 439 (1831) (repealed
1870); Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (1870) (amended 1905) (granting
copyright protection to any “author, inventor, designer, or proprietor” of protected works);
Copyright Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1432, § 4952, 33 Stat. 1000, 1000 (1905).
222. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
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a board of examiners, which were to be selected for their “knowledge
and skill in the particular art, manufacture, or branch of science to
which the alleged invention appertains.”223 It follows that, if experts
were to be chosen for their skill in particular sciences, promotion of
the progress of those sciences was among the objectives of the patent
laws. In the context of the Progress Clause, this shows the application
of the operative patent to both prefatory objects.
2. Statutory Structure
The observation that the copyright and patent laws are governed
by distinct statutes is irrefutable. However, the mere separation of
these two statutory regimes does not necessarily support a distributive
reading of the Progress Clause as proposed by Justice Thompson and
Karl Lutz. Instead, a more likely justification for their separation lies
in the different standards for creation and enforcement of the rights. It
is likely that the statutory distinction was dictated by policy concerns
such as limiting the need for judicial interpretation, clarifying the
differing standards between the two properties, and statutorily
establishing the boundaries of the two rights.
It is prudent to begin with the proposition that the two laws are
meant to serve the same purposes224 and they do so in similar ways.225
Despite the similarities at their ends—the purpose in the beginning,
and the means of enforcement at the end—the two laws have very
different intermediate concerns. Novelty and the scope of the
exclusive rights conferred, for example, are justifiably very different
between the two regimes. The recognition of this distinction by early
congressmen is hardly enough to prove that the Progress Clause was
intended to be read in the distributive.
These concerns better explain the existence of separate statutory
schemes for each than does the distributive reading of the Progress

223. Id. at § 7.
224. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress shall “promote Progress”); see
also Lemley, supra note 204, at 993 (“Intellectual property is fundamentally about incentives to
invent and create.”); O’Rourke, supra note 204, at 1180 (“[B]oth the copyright and patent laws
have grappled with the question of how to safeguard the incentive inherent in the grant of
exclusive rights . . . .”); John Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 119, 119 (1991) (“[T]he two laws perform the same function. . . . [N]o partisan
recommends one goal for patent and another for copyright.”).
225. Both statutes create a non-tangible property right empowering the owner to exclude
others from use. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006) (providing for copyright infringement);
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (providing for patent infringement); 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006)
(describing unfair import activities as those that infringe valid and enforceable patents or
copyrights).
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Clause. Copyright accrues upon the satisfaction of minimal creativity
and is subject to several limitations.226 Patent, on the other hand,
requires satisfaction of more stringent novelty standards, but provides
much stronger protection upon accrual under expansive doctrines like
the doctrine of equivalents.227 A given patent, then, can exert a
stronger force on related works than can a given copyright.
Admittedly, many of these issues may not have been fully
understood at the framing of the Constitution. However, the very
evidence that Lutz used to support the distributive reading shows that
the roots of these issues were understood. Rep. Burke wished to “take
care of copyrights immediately . . . because it is almost as easy to
ascertain literary as any other kind of property.”228 He recognized
patents were a more difficult subject.229 The difficulty that Burke
recognized seemingly had little effect on the passage of the bills. The
two original Progress bills were passed less than eight weeks apart.230
Surprisingly, especially if Burke’s statements are given the weight
afforded them by Lutz, the copyright bill was not the first passed;
patent was.231
Burke’s statement that patent would require more discussion
than copyright232 seems to indicate that he was at least generally
cognizant of the differing concerns. It is also worth noting that Burke
was a Representative from South Carolina—the only state to pass
patent legislation under the Articles of Confederation.233 It is likely
that, as a Representative and one-time judge of that state,234 Burke
was quite aware of the distinguishing issues that the two laws faced.
226. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); 17
U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2006).
227. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 24 (1997)
(holding that the test for equivalence is “whether the substitution [of one element for the other] .
. . is a change of substance as to make the doctrine of equivalents inapplicable; or conversely . . .
whether the change was so insubstantial” that doctrine of equivalents applies); see also
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (doctrine of
equivalents may be invoked if a device “performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result.”).
228. See Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 52.
229. See id.
230. Wiley, supra note 224, at 119.
231. Id.
232. Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 52.
233. Act of Mar. 26, 1784 (S.C.), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 180,
at 23 (emphasis added).
234. See Burke, Aedanus, (1743 – 1802), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B001086 (last
visited Jan. 6, 2012).
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This shows that the first Congress had many concerns in mind
while drafting the first copyright and patent acts. It is quite possible
that a grammatical quirk in the Progress Clause was one of these
concerns, but the recognized difficulty in developing a statute to
properly guide the judiciary in the fields of patent and copyright law
implies that Congress was aware of the need for different standards
for each. Congress’s recognition of these policy concerns explains the
separation of copyright from patent at least as adequately as does a
grammatical argument. It does not, however, indicate on its own that
the Framers intended for the Progress Clause to be read in
distribution.
3. Judicial Interpretation
In the first half of the nineteenth century, courts cited the written
description provision’s enablement clause in two different ways.
Sometimes they quoted the entirety of the provision, including the
term “science”.235 Other times, courts cited to the statute, but referred
only to the person skilled in the art.236 Some courts referred
interchangeably to persons skilled in the art and persons skilled in the
art or science.237 That citations in both forms were frequently made by
the same courts over an extended period of time, and even made in
the same decisions at times,238 suggests that rather than a developing
aversion to science as patent-eligible subject matter, reference only to
those skilled in the art was merely a shorthand citation form. It does
not appear to be a shift in the judicial understanding of the Progress
Clause, and certainly no reference was made to a balanced reading.
Cases addressing expert witnesses are also particularly
informative. What today is called “mechanical engineering” was
frequently referred to as “mechanical science” in early patent cases.239
One court went so far in its discussion as to place science prominently
alongside things freely accepted today as patent eligible useful arts,
235. See, e.g., Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 437, 484 (1848); Shaw v. Cooper, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 294-95 (1833); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 226 (1832); Evans v.
Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 380-81 (1822); Parker v. Stiles, 18 F.Cas. 1163, 1172 (C.C. Ohio
1849); Allen v. Blunt, 1 F.Cas. 448, 450 (C.C. Mass. 1845).
236. See, e.g., Wood v. Underhill, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 1, 4 (1847); Carver v. Hyde, 41 U.S.
513, 515-16 (1842).
237. See, e.g., Hogg, 47 U.S. at 462, 484; Raymond, 31 U.S. at 219, 226.
238. See Raymond, 31 U.S. at 226 (referring to one “skilled in the art or science”). But see
id. at 239 (referring to one “skilled in the art”).
239. See, e.g., Parker, 18 F.Cas. at 1176; Foote v. Silsby, 9 F.Cas. 373, 380
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1849); Blunt, 1 F.Cas. at 450; Brooks v. Jenkins, 4 F.Cas. 275, 280 (C.C. Ohio
1844) (all referring to mechanical sciences).
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including physics and chemistry.240
Justice Story provided one of the most detailed discussions in
this area.241 It is worth noting from the outset that the Justice’s
discussion comes from a case handed down in 1845.242 It is therefore
not truly contemporaneous with the Constitution, but it was handed
down only a decade after Justice Thompson’s initial observation of
the distributive reading.243 It is therefore as credible as Justice
Thompson’s reference to the proper reading of the Progress Clause. It
is also worth noting that Justice Story was nominated to the Supreme
Court in 1811—very close to ratification of the Constitution—by
James Madison, one of the two men responsible for the Progress
Clause.244
Justice Story made clear his view in discussing novelty and
enablement:
Still, it is obvious, that although a mere artisan, who had no
scientific knowledge on the subject, and who was unacquainted
with the various mechanical or chemical equivalents employed in
such cases, might not be able to make or compound the thing
patented, from the specification; yet a person who was skilled in
the very science on which it depended, and with the mechanical
and chemical powers and equivalents, might be able to teach and
demonstrate to an artisan how it was to be made or constructed, or
compounded or used. A fortiori he would be enabled so to do, if he
combined practical skill with a thorough knowledge of the
scientific principles on which it depended. But upon the question
of the novelty of an invention, and in reference to this, the identity
or diversity of two or more machines, or compounds, it is obvious,
that mere artisans, however well skilled in the mere details of their
art, might be wholly incapable of giving a satisfactory answer;
when a person trained in the science to which it belonged, would,
at a glance, ascertain whether the mechanical apparatus or
chemical compound was identical in its composition and structure

240.

See Brooks, 4 F.Cas. at 281.
[Y]ou perceive that the science of mechanics . . . affords a range for the highest
mental vigor, and requires as deep thought, as nice a discrimination, as any other
pursuit. The lights of chemistry, and of the highest branches of the mathematics,
are subservient to it. No one can be an accomplished mechanist, who has not
studied with some success the laws of physics.
Id. (emphasis added).
241. Blunt, 1 F.Cas. at 450.
242. Id.
243. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 684 (1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
244. See supra Part IV.B.2.b.
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or not, or whether the differences consisted in the mere change of
one known mechanical equivalent for another. In short, science
alone would be able to answer the question whether or not a
particular machine was substantially in its mode of operation new,
or identical with another, although with apparent differences of
form and structure, which might mislead the unscientific mind.
The like considerations would apply to a chemical
245
compound . . . .

Justice Story did not think “mere artisans,” or those “skilled in
the mere details of their art,” capable of understanding the workings
of technical inventions.246 Instead, it is those “skilled in the science
upon which it depends” to which patent courts should look.247 Justice
Story made clear that he believed “science alone” is able to answer
the question of novelty for a given invention.248
Justice Story’s language also indicates that he viewed mechanics
and chemistry as science, and not useful art. The quoted language
hints that Justice Story understood an artisan to be one who practices
an invention or puts the invention into effect—what might be
described as a skilled laborer today. Those skilled in science are the
ones truly capable of promoting progress.249 According to Justice
Story, it was the person “skilled in the very science” pertaining to the
invention that might be able to “teach and demonstrate” how to
practice an invention to an artisan.250
4. Conclusion to be Drawn from Post-Ratification History
Unlike the pre-ratification history, the post-ratification history is
rather inconsistent. Some of the evidence seems to indicate that the
Progress Clause was given a distributive reading. Equally forceful
evidence supports a unitary reading. The only thing that can be taken
from this period with any certainty is that the distributive reading was
not the well-established doctrine that De Wolf and Lutz would paint it
as.

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Blunt, 1 F.Cas. at 450 (emphasis added).
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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V. THE UNITARY READING UNDER HELLER
With this historical background in mind, it is time to turn to the
actual construction of the Progress Clause. This Part briefly addresses
the reasoning inherent in the Lutz article for the purpose of showing
that that reasoning is not persuasive upon a deeper review of the
relevant history. It then turns to the Heller analysis and applies the
foregoing history. After this, it offers some final observations on the
history of the intellectual property laws and the Progress Clause.
A. The Textual Interpretation
Constitutional analysis begins with the proposition that where
the language of a provision is clear, there is no need to engage in
construction.251 The foregoing history and the language of the
Progress Clause show that it is not such a provision. First, the
distributive reading did not become the generally accepted reading
until more than a century and a half after the Framing. 252 Second, as
the history described above shows, the terminology of the Clause is
ambiguous at best. Both of these points demonstrate that there are at
least two reasonable interpretations of the Progress Clause, and
construction is therefore necessary to ascertain the proper scope and
meaning of the Clause.
When construction is necessary, it is important to take a
historical look at the “state of things” at the time a constitutional
provision is adopted.253 This historical background is relevant to
determining what the “normal and ordinary” meaning of
constitutional language was to “ordinary citizens of the founding
generation.”254 Evidence of contemporary interpretation can also
speak to the understanding of those ordinary citizens.255
251. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 338-39 (1816) (“If the text be
clear and distinct, no restriction upon its plain and obvious import ought to be admitted, unless
the inference be irresistible.”); see also United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)
(“[W]here the intention is clear there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation
or addition.”).
252. See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 463-64 (describing the 1949 Lutz argument as
the basis for general acceptance of the distributive reading).
253. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 723 (1838) (“In the
construction of the constitution we must look to the history of the times, and examine the state
of things existing when it was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and
the remedy.”) (internal citations omitted).
254. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-77 (2008).
255. See id. at 605-19 (using post-ratification commentary, legislation and case law on the
Second Amendment to assist in construction of that constitutional provision).
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The foregoing historical discussion speaks directly to this “state
of things” and to the understanding of ordinary citizens. Admittedly,
there is some evidence that supports reading the Progress Clause as
requiring separate patent and copyright laws. They were legislated
separately, and the Patent Act’s title indicated that it was intended to
protect the useful arts.256 The Clause is, arguably, a balanced sentence
that links science, authors and writings together, separate from useful
arts, inventors and discoveries.257 That, however, is the extent of the
evidence that supports a distributive reading.
First, addressing Lutz’s position that the rejection of a single
piece of legislation in favor of two, it is worth noting that the very
first proposed piece of copyright and patent legislation was intended
to address them both together.258 This unitary bill was even passed on
its first reading.259 The laws were not separated until it was observed
that policy reasons called for separation.260 These facts seem to
indicate that the Progress Clause was understood to be a unitary
provision, and copyright and patent were not separate in the minds of
the early legislators until a viable justification was given. Even then,
they were only separated in legislation; the only evidence for this
separation is a suggestion that patent was more difficult to deal with
than copyright261—there is no evidence that there was a new
understanding that the Progress Clause granted two separate powers.
Further, as has been shown, much more historical evidence
supports the unitary reading of the Progress Clause. Among other
things, patents were first applied in England to expressive, or
“scientific” content rather than useful arts.262 These rights were still
being enforced in the late eighteenth century.263 Similarly, there is

256. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (bearing the title “An Act to
promote the progress of useful Arts.”); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 684
(1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (“Th[e Progress Clause] is to be construed distributively, and
must have been so understood; for when congress came to execute this power by legislation, the
subjects are kept distinct, and very different provisions are made respecting them.”).
257. See DE WOLF, supra note 18, at 15; see also Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4,
at 51.
258. See Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 52.
259. Id.
260. See id. (noting Representative Burke’s observation that literary property was easy to
acquire while inventive property was more difficult).
261. See id.
262. See LINACRE, supra note 134 (claiming a printing privilege in 1512); see also
PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 42 (stating that the first printing “privilege from the sovereign”
was granted in 1518).
263. See generally Stationers’ Co. v. Carnan, (1775) 96 Eng. Rep. 590 (K.B.).
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evidence that members of the Continental Congress, including James
Madison, viewed copyright as a tool for encouraging the development
of useful arts and discoveries.264
Evidence from after the adoption of the Progress Clause also
demonstrates the understanding that “ordinary citizens” had of the
provision. The 1790 Patent Act, by far the shortest-lived iteration of
the Patent Act to date, was amended in 1793 to expressly include the
word “science.”265 Another reference to the word “science” was added
in the 1836 revision.266
This evidence, along with the remainder of the aforementioned
historical background, constitutes the first mechanism in the
construction of the Progress Clause. While historical practice does not
lead conclusively to one construction or the other, the fact that a
definitive construction of the Progress Clause eludes our grasp lends
itself to the conclusion that the Clause was meant and understood to
be broad. Given that patent law was applied to science and useful arts,
while copyright was viewed as conducive to the encouragement of
science and the useful arts, is certainly ambiguous. Yet it is that
ambiguity that best explains the scope of the Progress Clause: it was
meant to be given a unitary reading. Perhaps it was the wisdom of the
Framers to make the Clause ambiguous in order to avoid disputes
over which power the exclusive right to what subject matter arose
under.
An examination of the relevant history and understanding of the
Progress Clause—the very same framework used by Lutz—does not
conclusively establish that copyrights are limited to science and that
patents are limited to useful arts. The Progress Clause is, in fact,
susceptible to a much broader interpretation, and the Supreme Court
often comes down in favor of the broader interpretation.267 As

264. See, e.g., BUGBEE, supra note 178 at 113 (presenting the view of copyright as
something that can promote the useful arts); Resolution of May 2, 1783, reprinted in
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 179 at 11 (presenting copyright as capable of promoting
useful discoveries).
265. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
266. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §§ 6-7, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
267. A subset of due process, for example, has led to an unwritten right to privacy. See
Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (“Although ‘(t)he Constitution does
not explicitly mention any right of privacy,’ the Court has recognized that one aspect of the
‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is ‘a right of
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy.’) (quoting Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)). There are other examples of the Court opting for the least restrictive
interpretation of other constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court has read the Second
Amendment as protecting the right of all citizens to keep and bear arms, rather than limiting the
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Professor Oliar has argued, the purely historical mechanism of
constitutional interpretation seems to call for a unitary reading.268
B. The Heller Interpretation
As discussed above, the Progress Clause shares a similar
structure with the Second Amendment.269 The article now applies the
Heller framework to the historical evidence as the second mechanism
of constitutional interpretation.
The first step under Heller is to determine the meaning of the
operative clause.270 This article has not challenged the modern
understanding of the operative language. Therefore, it treats “authors”
and “writings” as the subjects of copyright law and “inventors” and
“discoveries” as the subjects of patent law.271 This Article has also not
challenged the language of the prefatory clause, so the second step
needs no analysis.
It is the third step—the consistency between the prefatory and
operative clauses—that really matters to the Progress Clause. There is
very little historical evidence that suggests an unambiguous
separation of science as the object of copyright and useful arts as the
object of patent.272 Indeed, there is significantly more evidence that
speaks to an overlap in the subject matter of the regimes. 273 Without
rehashing the prior historical review, a few facts speak directly to the
question of whether science and the useful arts must be treated
separately from the viewpoint of the operative clause.
With respect to science, the very first domestic English patent
covered a book—a device of general knowledge, not a useful art.274
provision to only militiamen. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 596 (2008). This
habit of broad interpretation has also extended to congressional powers. The Interstate
Commerce Clause, which could reasonably be interpreted to only allow Congress to govern
interstate commerce, has been interpreted to allow Congress to control intrastate activity as well.
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (observing that the Interstate Commerce
power can extend to “intrastate activities” that may have an effect on interstate commerce). The
Spending Clause has been interpreted to allow Congress to expand its power by indirectly
achieving results that Congress could not otherwise have achieved. See South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (holding that the spending power may be used by Congress to
indirectly achieve “objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly.”).
268. See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 463-69; see also Oliar, Making Sense, supra
note 13, at 1823.
269. See supra Part III.B.
270. Heller, 554 U.S. at 578.
271. See supra Part V.B.
272. See supra Part IV.
273. Id.
274. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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Similar patents were still being granted and enforced in England at
around the time of the Framing.275 According to Lutz, general
knowledge falls under the term science.276 If true, this means that the
Framers would have understood patents to be applicable to science.
Likewise, there is clear evidence of a relationship between
copyright and useful arts. The Continental Congress appointed a
committee “to consider the most proper means of cherishing genius
and useful arts throughout the United States by securing to the
authors or publishers of new books their property in such works.”277
States were encouraged to adopt copyright laws to promote these
useful arts.278
Given this history, the distributive reading’s use of science and
useful arts to limit the scope of copyright and patent is in direct
conflict with the Heller framework. Because patent and copyright
were understood to apply to both the sciences and useful arts, the
distributive reading improperly contracts the scope of the operative
language by importing prefatory limitations.279
This begs the question: what is the proper scope of patent and
copyright? The unitary reading of the Progress Clause takes the
Constitution to grant power to Congress for one purpose: to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts. That is the extent of the
proposed change from the distributive reading, which treats the
promotion of science and promotion of useful arts as separate and
distinct powers.280 Patent and copyright remain conceptually distinct,
but under the unitary reading, there is one single purpose to the
Progress Clause. The result is that patent law secures the discoveries
of inventors, whether those discoveries are part of science or the
useful arts. Copyright likewise secures the writings of authors,
whether they are part of science or the useful arts. The current
expression/application dichotomy does not conflict with this reading.
The language of the Progress Clause makes the separation of the
two regimes appropriate despite indications to the opposite. Although
history makes clear that patent may protect science or useful arts, and
likewise with copyright, the language of the Clause indicates that the

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

See Stationers’ Co. v. Carnan, (1775) 96 Eng. Rep. 590 (K.B.).
Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 50.
BUGBEE, supra note 178, at 112.
See supra note 179.
See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577-78 (2008).
Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 51.

MILLER

2012]

3/23/2012 11:28 AM

UNITARY PROGRESS CLAUSE

283

full scope of these regimes is not applicable in all cases: only the
discoveries of inventors and the writings of authors may be protected.
The operative clause therefore places a limitation upon what types of
progress may be protected, but it does not place a limitation upon the
subject matter of these works (i.e., whether they are science or useful
art).
The critical point of this reading, in the context of the Heller
analysis, is that it is the operative clause that dictates the distinction,
and not the prefatory clause. The unitary reading only places
limitations in accord with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, while
the distributive reading limits the Progress Clause based on purposive
language.
According to the proposed reading, both regimes are subject to
several limitations similar to those of the current reading. Neither
patent nor copyright is extended to any idea or fact, nor does either
right enable an author or inventor to withdraw information from the
public domain, because protecting such would not serve to promote
progress, and would not be in accord with the original purposes of
patent and copyright. These limitations remain unchanged from the
law under the distributive reading.281
The major distinction between copyright and patent under the
proposed reading is the formal requirements to qualify for each.
These requirements under the unitary reading are very similar to those
under the distributive reading. It is well established that copyright
inures in expressive content.282 Patent, so courts have hinted, is
appropriately used to promote the progress of “applicative” works—
works that apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas
in a useful manner.283 Therefore, the unitary reading makes little
281. Neither patent nor copyright protects ideas or facts. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991) (“The most fundamental axiom of copyright
law is that ‘[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.’”); accord Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”). Nor may either work serve to withdraw alreadyexisting information from the public domain. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982
F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[Public domain] material is free for the taking and cannot be
appropriated by a single author even though it is included in a copyrighted work.”); 35 U.S.C. §
102 (2006) (generally denying patent protection for previously known, used or described
inventions).
282. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) (stating that expression is
copyrightable); see also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (stating
that “writings” in the Progress Clause means the “literary productions . . . by which the ideas in
the mind of the author are given visible expression.”).
283. See Joshua I. Miller, Unknown Futures and the Known Past: What Can Patent Learn
from Copyright in the New Technological Age?, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 56-58 (2011)
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change to eligibility law for either regime, save for its inclusion of
science as appropriate subject matter for patent protection (copyright,
it should be noted, has never really refused protection to works of
authorship on the useful arts).284
The transition from distributive to unitary reading does not result
in a major shift in the law. The theoretical foundations of patent and
copyright remain largely unchanged. The progress standards in each
still operate to limit protection to those things not yet in the public
domain and the types of work that patent and copyright each protect
remains unchanged. The only difference is that the progress of
science now falls within the scope of patent and the progress of useful
arts now expressly falls within the scope of copyright. This shift has
little impact on most areas of law, but better explains their existence
than the distributive reading.285
C. Observations on the Unitary Reading
There is one final observation worth making that is neither facial
nor structural. That is that the unitary reading is actually in accord
with earlier English law. First, early patents all arose under the same
power—the Royal Prerogative.286 More important, these early English
patents were granted for the same purpose. That purpose, generally
put, was to encourage and expand English industrial advancement.287
After the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies, which created
the first legal distinction between industrial and printing patents,288
these distinct rights were still governed by the same statute.289 In this
sense, then, the Statute of Monopolies very much hinted at the unitary
reading of the American Progress Clause: two separate, but related,
rights, granted to the same purpose. This is very similar to the unitary
reading of the Progress Clause.
In the end, it can be seen that, while the unitary reading of the

(arguing that patent law has hinted at, and in some cases, used, an “application” standard to
determine patent eligibility); see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an
application of a law of nature or a mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection.”).
284. Clearly, scientific textbooks or articles qualify for copyright protection, and promote
the progress of useful arts.
285. See infra Part V for a discussion of the effect the unitary reading has on several areas
of law.
286. See supra Part IV.B.1.
287. See Mossoff, Development, supra note 94, at 1259; Klitzke, supra note 107, at 625.
288. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 & 22 Jac. I, c. 3, §§ 6, 9, 10. (Eng.).
289. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
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Clause is something relatively new in modern American
jurisprudence,290 the general idea is actually inherent in the furthest
ancestors of the Progress Clause. Given the Heller Court’s reliance on
history, this historical observation lends credence to the structural
analysis presented in the Article.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the history of the Progress Clause
does not fit as neatly into the distributive reading as Lutz argued.
Indeed, the plain history of the Progress Clause is, at most,
ambiguous. Typically, constitutional ambiguities like this have been
interpreted in the broadest manner—here, the unitary reading—rather
than the narrowest manner. More importantly, though, the Supreme
Court has recently explained how the structure of a constitutional
provision can contribute to our understanding of the provision.
Although the structure of the Progress Clause is not exactly identical
to the structure of the Second Amendment, this Article has argued
that the structures are similar enough that the Supreme Court’s
Second Amendment analysis can inform our analysis of the Progress
Clause.
Following the Court’s analysis, one is once again forced to
conclude that the unitary reading is the correct reading. Historically, it
was understood that patents could apply to science, and copyright to
useful arts. Therefore, given the Heller Court’s requirement of a
logical connection between the two clauses of a constitutional
provision, the Progress Clause must be understood to allow patent or
copyright to apply to science or useful arts.

290. It does not appear that the reading was proposed in any form until 2006. See Oliar,
Making Sense, supra note 13, at 1823.

